Session Three 3-day
Instructor: Laura Gonzalez
Rose, Jacqueline, ‘The Imaginary’ in Slavoj Zizek ed. Jacques Lacan, Critical Evaluations in Cultural Theory, vol. 1: Psychoanalytic Theory and Practice, London and New York: Routledge, 2003, pp. 7–32 [26 pages]
What we see in the mirror is never the truth. What we see in the mirror is never the whole.
Rose attempts to re-contextualize the use of the concept of Imaginary in film theory back to its psychoanalytic roots; correct the mis-understandings in the psychoanalytic literature which served as the basis for the concept in film theory; question assumed position of spectator in film.
Observer-technology relationship; technology as apparatus purely subjective; objectification of the subjective via the technology; mirror stage...subject identifies with ideal.
The subject exists as producer of symptoms; visual image as hallucination, substitution (memory), dream.
Film theory use of ‘identification’ to imply films compliance with spectators’ desires.
Lacan’s The Mirror Stage take off from Freud’s On Narcissism.
Imaginary=Narcissism. The image reflected is itself.
Freud: first sexual satisfaction is derived auto-erotically (from own body and ego), but how does this lead to the development of narcissism if this is present from the start?
Lacan: the ego as imaginary instance whose source is in the new psychological form (neue psychische Gestalt per Freud) at the moment of the subjects initial encounter. Ego is a construct functioning as the imaginary; making and made through the role of preserving the pleasure the subject derives from the imaginary in its encounter with the real.
What we see in the mirror is that which we desire to see. What we desire to see is the whole truth of our self.
What does Lacan mean by the ego is an imaginary function? How does he differ from Freud in the role of the ego as that which sets reality to “satisfaction of the pleasure principle”? [11]
Lacan: synthesis--the control of objects by the subject is dependent upon coordination/combination of the visual with the ability to conceptualize the body/self as a whole.
Lacan: gestalt--(form) the ability of the subject to form an image of the self as a whole and represent it as such to the self.
Young children, uncoordinated when not confronted by the image, gain coordination through the stability the image provides. This is why we incorporate so many mirrors in the toys played with and the spaces occupied by young children; as a means to not only recognition of their own image, but to develop coordination of movement through their repeated encounter with it.
But often the child only is able to see a partial image of the self, alienated from the whole by mirrors too small to reveal all. Yet despite the division of the self into bits and pieces the child identifies bit by bit parts of the self and is able to create a full, if not complete image via assumptions of connections; from this gaining the ability to identify object and subject.
Freud: subject is individual ego and member of species. Regards to libido/sexual desire one is focused on preservation of the self and the other on propagation of the species. The object of desire of each is geared toward these: self preservation desires the object of self; species propagation desires the same species.
Lacan: In both cases knowledge of self, who we are is necessary; we aggressively reject that which we cannot identify. We are both alienated from and attracted to the partial self image...we recognize and at the same time are unsure of the recognition of the partial image of self we confront in the event it is not the self but an other. Here the role of language/communication enters the picture.
ideal ego and ego ideal
Interesting how they are mirrored phrases…
ideal ego: that perfect image of the self, minus all other, the subject’s narcissism projects onto itself; it is the image encountered first in childhood and from which subject desires to recover, never part from---”what he himself was” [14]; a projected image of the ‘whole’ self Freud deems impossible
ego ideal: in the moment when the subject realizes he cannot recover the desired image it becomes “what he himself would like to be” [14]; the projected image in secondary, internalized form, changed by new information gained through critical insight outside of the self, from the other. For Lacan this turns to a projection of some form of ideal, whether of the ego or something else...an idea or form.
Our ability to identify and imitate not just the self, but the other in the mirror is what leads to the development of our ability to empathize and express compassion. I think of the children's’ game of mirroring...two stand face to face, one leads and the other follows the movement and expressions of the leader, then the roles are reversed. I also think of three legged races...tied together one leg, one arm so that they are connected like a single body pressed to a mirror, together having to navigate the space as a single self.
Freud’s third type of identification:
“(c) identification which arises with a new perception of a (repressed) common quality shared with some other person who is not the object of the sexual instinct.” [17]
Lacan on Freud’s three types of identification:
“...the gradual intrusion of the axis of desire on to the axis of identification,...”[18]
the distinction is less clear, ‘gradual intrusion’ instead of clear-cut phasing…things begin to mix, become less distinct, but all is directed to an external object
Ichspaltung--the subject sees itself only as a whole by being placed elsewhere [presence/absence]
unity does not equal totality...one is unified by the unique traits uniqueness...but there is no wholeness here even in repetition the uniqueness is maintained as unique...identity as a function of repeated difference.
The photocopying of an image’s subsequent photocopying of each photocopy until the image disappears...a mirror set where the reverse ordering of the images brings it back to the original. [I am not finding this artist’s name in my notes...what is her name?]
“The moment of castration is that in which the Other reveals itself as exponent of desire or false witness, and it represents the final collapse of the Other as the guarantor of certitude. Desire is now the point of intersection between two demands, and is left over as that which simply cannot be signified….it (the object) is identification now conditioned by its function as support of desire.” [23-24]
The visualization of this relationship in Figure 6...a mix of nautilus, labyrinth, seed...not separate and/or overlapping, but a spiraling in and self contained relationship.
Lacan: The Look as objet petit a’...”the idealising presumption...subject assumes it ‘can see itself seeing itself’”[25] reversal of subject-object
What I was trying to express in stage I of Look In Glass…
“Only the subject--the human subject, the subject of desire which is man’s essence--is not, unlike the animal, entirely taken in by his imaginary capture. He manages to locate himself within it. How? To the extent that he isolates the function of the screen and plays off it. Indeed man knows how to play with the mask as that beyond which there is the look. The screen acts here as the site of mediation.” ( Le Seminaire XI: 99/107) [26]
“What is manipulated in the triumph of the assumption of the image of the body in the mirror, is that object, all the more elusive in that it appears only marginally: the exchange of looks’ (E70).” [27] and Figure 9
Hans Holbein’s The Ambassadors
challenging the subject’s fixed relation to the picture…[27]
“...since it is only as the subject withdraws that the object can be discerned,...”[27]
Privation...Frustration...Castration...desire over identification...secondary identification of the spectator, not seeing itself but recognizing self in object...replace cinema screen with the self portrait...the ‘all-perceiving subject’ [28]
“2. The fact that the subject’s own body is not on the screen does not necessarily distinguish its experience from that of the mirror stage;...” [28]
Freud, Sigmund (1905 [1901]) Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria, Peter Gay ed. The Freud Reader, New York: W.W. Norton, 1989, pp. 172–239 [68 pages]
Fragment: noun. a small part separated or broken off something. verb. break or cause to break into smaller pieces.
It is impossible for me to approach this reading with any sense of neutrality. Can anyone say they can read Freud neutrality in the 21st century? Or for that matter, is any reading of anything ‘neutral’? I think not. Particularly this piece, his first case study, which has been taken apart and analyzed bit by bit in the 100 plus years since its publication. So where after reading this text should I begin writing about Freud and Dora? I thought about my personal notions of hysteria, Freud, psychoanalysis, transference, feminism, patriarchy, etc., but there is so much to say. Looking at the title I decided the best place to begin is with the first word: fragment.
When we encounter a fragment we do so with the realization that it is only a small part of something much larger, and usually we cannot say what that larger, whole to which the fragment belongs is. The fragment of a sentence implies there is more to be said, just as the sentence as a fragment of a story implies there is more to the story than we are being told. And that is what this case study written by Freud is: a fragment of a greater story to which we cannot know the whole story. Freud is still criticized for not just his actions, his handling of the psychoanalysis of Dora, but also how he presented the fragment of her story. Yet at a number of points in the case study he did admit that he omitted bits and pieces, that it was not the whole, only what he deemed essential to the telling...even if at later points he also admitted to errors in judgement in his actions if not his telling. Does this admittance lessen those other statements he made which are presented as fact because he himself could not see that they too were smaller fragments of another story he could not recognize playing a part in? If we chose not to ‘forgive’ Freud of his errors because of the impact the acceptance of these fragments as whole have had on the lives of others are we also falling victim to our own inability to see and acknowledge a fragmentation of another story in which we play a part?
Transference: the redirection to a substitute, usually a therapist, of emotions that were originally felt in childhood (in a phase of analysis called transference neurosis )
In the case study of Dora Freud identifies transference as a key part of progression in the case, yet he also admits to seeing this after the therapy was broken off by Dora...she fragmented the therapy of her own volition although it was not begun under her own volition but under the influence of her father...Freud admitted to not realizing the extent of the play of transference had not just in the therapist-patient relationship, but in the other relationships in the life of Dora which Freud identified as relevant to her ‘hysteria’.
Countertransference is defined as redirection of a therapist's feelings toward a patient, or more generally, as a therapist's emotional entanglement with a patient.
Transference and Countertransference...can’t have one without the other. Looking into the mirror the face we see looks back at us, and we look back into ourselves.
Many of the problems in Freud’s case study, whether they were acknowledged by him or not, have led to further discussions and changes in practice. As for Freud deeming the breaking off of the therapy by Dora as a sign of its (his) failure, looked at this action on the part of Dora today it can be viewed as more of a success. Dora acted directly of her own volition, and did not react in a ‘hysterical’ manner to the turn in the therapist-patient relationship that Freud himself was unable to see at that time. Perhaps if Dora had continued with the therapy it would have ended in a greater failure for her, while from Freud’s viewpoint he would have had his success...but then that success would have been false.
As to the diagnosis of hysteria and Freud’s reasoning behind Dora’s responses I think little can be said from today’s viewpoint other than the confrontation and exploration of these topics through a talk-therapy, however hurtful it intentionally or unintentionally was, led to a further building upon the process which has eventually had some positive results.
Malman, Charles, ‘On Obsessional Neurosis in Slavoj Zizek ed. Jacques Lacan, Critical Evaluations in Cultural Theory, vol. 1: Psychoanalytic Theory and Practice, London and New York: Routledge, 2003, pp. 117–124 [8 pages]
Looking at Freud’s case study: Rat Man
“If a clinical study had to present a clinical picture, that of obsessional neurosis would pose a singular difficulty, because it presents a confused collection of traits each of which when taken alone is nevertheless perfectly clear.” [117]
A potage, the only soup my six year old will eat, because pureed to a pulp he cannot recognize the vegetables contained within. If the soup was left unpureed he’d know exactly what was in it; but this way he only can tell by the color if it might contain more carrot, pumpkin or sweet potato...orange...or peas, kale, spinach or broccoli...green...or plain old potato...white. Some of these vegetables suit his palate, others less so...color tells him nothing, so he has to taste it, and if the combination is acceptable he’ll get both his RDA of vitamins and dessert...if not, he’ll wake up pretty hungry the next morning.
At times he has decided that the orange soup he is eating is “pumpkin soup”. He likes pumpkin so he eats it; in fact there is no pumpkin in the soup, only carrot, also orange in color, and spiced similar to pumpkin soup. The implication is there that it is the soup he wants to eat, he eats it and his desire is met. Othertimes he has sees orange soup, and decided it must be pumpkin, because that is what he wants, but upon tasting realizes it is pure carrot minus the similar spices...it tastes of carrot and he hates carrot soup; he gags and vomits. The next time he sees the orange soup he does not want to taste it, it might be carrot, but then again maybe this time it is pumpkin...conflict arises, to risk tasting something that causes displeasure, or taste and find the pleasure he desires?
Suppose that everytime he sees an orange soup after having tasted the carrot soup he vividly recalls the displeasurable taste in his mouth, and begins to gag, perhaps even vomit. So he avoids orange soup. After a number of years his taste has changed. He eats carrots, raw and cooked, but still avoids orange soup...the thought of it makes him gag, but he no longer can recall why. He only knows that seeing orange soup elicits a bad taste in his mouth which in turn causes a reflexive gag.
What if there was no taste memory involved? What if he saw orange soup and gagged? What if he could no longer see orange, would he still gag? He can see a pureed soup in front of him. He knows he likes some pureed soups, but not orange pureed soup. Should he try the soup he sees even if he cannot see its color? But what if he gags? He could always ask: what’s in the soup, becoming an expert on all types of potage so as to avoid all the orange ones.
What if it wasn’t the color, but the texture of the soup?
A lot of what ifs and assumptions can be made, but that does not mean we are any closer to the truth or eating the soup.
Mannoni, Octave, “I Know Well, but All the Same …” pp. 68–92 [25 pages]
Beliefs span a very wide range and raise a number of problems viewed from a psychological perspective. We can’t really say what or why beliefs are what they were or are among any person or group of people. We cannot even say why or what changes in beliefs entail. Perfection in the belief is often insisted upon, even when the belief itself is no longer believable to the person or group insistent upon this perfection. Why? Because we want to preserve the belief in the belief.
“Something similar occurs in the theater…”[68]
...but it is intentional. In the day to day the range of intentionality of the psychological problems which arise from belief range from the simple to more complex (“surprising”).
Why didn’t Freud really try to deal with belief? Perhaps because belief is unknowable, and Freud was all about knowing “why” something is the way it is. My personal belief is that Freud’s exploration of fetishism and his explanations of Verleugnung and sexuality today lack reasonable knowledge to address these ideas either reasonably or rationally; however religious belief and scientific knowledge provide a better starting point to the discussion of the psychological impact and subsequent expressions which arise from the conflict between the two.
“Problems connected with religious faith have to be put aside at the outset; they are of a different nature, even if it is a fact that faith is always mingled with belief.” [72]
While I understand the point trying to be made, I do not agree with this statement, at least relative to the culture and society I live in. People who have no personal history of association with or formation by religious beliefs have been influenced by these beliefs, even if it is at an unconscious level, because of a history which shaped certain cultural norms we share. How much of the examples and explanations provided by Freud can be traced back to a conflict which arises in conjunction to religious beliefs? Or is it a question of which came first, the chicken or the egg? The story of Adam and Eve’s fall, or the belief in the fall itself?
Therefore as I read this piece from Mannoni I recalled a text I presented in an Ethics class while studying Philosophy in Germany many years ago. The text was titled “Glaube” by Eckhard Nordhofen. “Glaube”...‘belief’...is differentiated from “Wissen”...’knowledge’...in the inability to place any reason at its basis. We can rationalize our beliefs, but we cannot reasonably express them. Knowledge, on the other hand, is based in reason. Due to the inaccuracies in how we use language, we often say we “know” something is true when it is not reasonable knowledge that we are referring to, rather it is our rationalized belief. The omission of the second part, the “well, but…” that Mannoni mentions is where the confusion sets in, and as he points out is where psychoanalysis picks up the reins from psychology. [71] It is not a contradiction to be in possession of both belief and knowledge, even if the ideas they refer to contradict themselves. Although the past century has been one where we have sought in the name of a truth-filled knowledge to separate “faith” from “reason” by exposing these contradictions, currently we are finding people, who wander one of the two paths more frequently, speaking out against an exclusivity of the route one chooses for life’s journey. Scientist write that there comes a point in our knowledge (which is still, not to be denied expanding) when we can no longer ‘reasonably know’. That is the point where we must go beyond reason and enter into the realm of belief. At the same time there are persons of many of the world’s religions who acknowledge there is reasonable knowledge that cannot be denied...although there are still many who chose a fundamentalist approach to their beliefs to when confronted with ‘known facts’.
When confrontation between the two, belief and knowledge, occur without the ability of the person to accept the validity of both and their co-existence within the life of the individual, internal conflict occurs. How this conflict is expressed can be either through conscious or unconscious responses. It is a conflict of both the subject and the object, calling the validity of both into question through the contradiction expressed by “...,but all the same…” a denial of the truth [knowledge] happens by not denying, but by quantifying the belief, which is tantamount to its denial [Freud].
Repression:
“Yet the “but all the same” is not unconscious. It finds its explanation in the fact that desire or fantasy operates, as it were, at a distance.Plainly, that is the point at which we must ultimately arrive. But we cannot do so directly, nor does this justify oversimplifications….although repression is in the final analysis the key to the problem, as always we must begin by examining Verleugnung as such.” [72]
Mannoni’s differentiation between faith and belief with the example of the Jews belief in the existence of other gods while maintaining a faith in one god I find to be splitting something which cannot be split. [73] The unconditional quality of faith is directly tied to a belief which is equally unconditional. The belief in the existence of others is dependent upon the faith in the one above others; in this case faith is not different, it is at the most a simple superlative of belief, but remains belief.
Sustaining belief
“...what can one believe if authority is deception [mystification]?” [75]
While reading this text I recalled a film I first saw years ago, Nostradamus Kid (1992). The story is a semi-autobiographical tale of the writer/director Bob Ellis’ upbringing as a Seventh Day Adventist, his subsequent break with those beliefs as a university student, and his development and education as a writer. In many of the scenes this question of what can one believe if authority is deception...authority of the church, of the state, of the academic institution, within personal relationships...arises. The main character, Ken Elkin, reveals how this questioning of beliefs that have become unbelievable can lead to some pretty destructive behaviors.
“A crucial feature of every initiation is that the initiated make a solemn vow to keep the secret.”[76]
A particular scene in Nostradamus Kid came to mind where the pastor reveals to a young Ken that his preaching incorporated exaggerations...theatrical and literary devices...in order to increase the impact of what he was saying and making it more believable to the congregants at the church camp. This revelation...castration...led to Ken’s further questioning and conflict between the systems and structures he was taught to believe in. He never seemed to be able to completely ‘keep the secret’, nor did he try to, instead through his destructive behaviors he shouted it out; but most of the time others chose not to hear him, maintaining their belief in the deception. As Ken learned to apply the lesson of the deception within his own career as a writer...and playwright...he obviously still struggled with the conflict and this continued with self-destructive behavior, but he also had relative successes and by the end realized he had gained the insight and answers he sought.
Various Authors, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, extract from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV-TR [5 pages]
Although this is not humerous for those suffering from the disorder, I often think of this one skit when imagining rituals people develop as a ‘magical’ device to deal with obsessional fears, and how these rituals can progress into compulsive behaviors.
Never speak the name of the Scottish Play
“The first diagnostic task is to determine whether or not patients have true obsessions or compulsions. Once it has been established that they do, then a differential diagnosis of these “true” symptoms must be pursued.” …”in contrast with obsessive-compulsive disorder, gratification or pleasure is involved in giving in to the “compulsion.” [3]
A few years ago I realized something strange about myself, something I would say was not like the me that I had always known. This strange thing was the desire to have a ‘clean, smudge-free, dust-free, everything in its place’ house. Although I have always known I can be organized, and am very good at cleaning and tidying up, I never felt the desire to do so for a reason other than common household maintenance and hygiene. In the past I would clean a room, the apartment, the house and when it was done I felt good, task accomplished. This good feeling would last until the day...days, weeks, at times months (depending on how busy I was with other things)... when I’d look up and realize the place was a mess and it was time to clean again. The cycle would repeat..normal behavior. But then I realized one day I was constantly cleaning up, it no longer felt so good when it was done, because I could always see a spot I’d missed or a smudge would suddenly reappear...then I would get angry and begin cleaning again.
This went on for a while, but I began to notice that the moments when the ‘cleaning zwang’ was at its worst were those times when I either had the least amount of personally fulfilling work (ie. art) on my daily agenda or when I had others outside of my nuclear family visiting or regularly dropping by. In other words if was becoming a psychological response to the frustations of ‘stay-at-home’ parenthood.
After thinking about it for awhile, I was able to trace this behavior back to these two factors: boredom and fear of judgement. The first factor, I was bored with my daily agenda because it did not involve that which I truly wanted to do, so I overdid that which remained to be done...housework...was a pretty straight foreward factor to deal with. The solution was to not let the housework get in the way of the studio time, to structure the cleaning time in a way that it would neither interfere with or provide an excuse for not working on the art. The second factor has been more difficult to address, but it is directly linked to the first factor: fear of judgement. I had done something relatively incomprehensible in the culture and social class I come from, I had quit a well paying full time ‘job’ in publishing to stay at home with my kids and have more time for art, the only profession I ever wanted and the one I had spent ten years practicing before circumstances led to that ‘respectable position’.
To prove that I was indeed doing something ‘valuable’ I tried to keep my house spotless. But spotlessness, like any form of perfection, is unattainable and over a course of extended striving can really wear one out.
I still notice there are times when I can’t walk past something without picking it up, times when I just have to wipe the smudge away or else I will get grumpier and grumpier. And there are times when I plan to wipe away one fingerprint and realize that I have started to clean half the house...then I have to force myself to stop. I understand that I could under the right circumstances easily slip back into that uncontrolled cleaning.
This definition of obsessive-compulsive disorder speaks of a number of things such as waxing and waning, related but different disorders, and the hereditary factor which made me think of my own awareness about the cleaning. While I’ve never sought professional advice or treatment regarding this, it does make me realize how easy it could be to develop or slip into obsessive-compulsive behaviors for anyone.
One of the ideas about seizure disorders I learned through my research this past year was that neuroscience now believes that all humans have a personal seizure threshold...for each of us it is different, but we all have a point where the right combination or amount of triggers can induce a seizure which in turn lowers the threshold allowing for increased numbers of future seizures and ultimately the diagnosis of a seizure disorder...nonetheless still with no known cause. Perhaps this is also the case with obsessive-compulsive disorder. We all have a personal threshold which can be crossed and lead to the development of the disorder.
I feel that as we learn more about the functioning of the brain we will find that this idea of thresholds not only holds true for many (neurotic and physiological brain) disorders, but the concept will enable us to view the disorders with more respect, acknowledging the likelihood that any one of us could develop a disorder at any time. In turn this awareness could help prevent development of the disorders via the knowledge individuals can gain of their personal thresholds. For those whose thresholds have been crossed awareness of the commonness of the disorders would hopefully lead to more respectful and helpful treatments.
Adam Phillips Phobias
I don’t like heights. I don’t like to fly. I don’t like sudden, loud noises. I experience a wide variety of fears, but perhaps the concept of thresholds which I mentioned in relation to the previous text, a phobia is a matter of having crossed the personal threshold of what was before a simple fear?