Preface by Emily Apter
Philosophy in Translation
The book was the brainchild of its French editor, Barbara Cassin, herself a specialist of classical philoso- phy. In 1998, in the introduction to her translation of Parmenides’s poem On Nature, Cassin had already as- cribed the “untranslatable” to the interminability of translating: the idea that one can never have done with translation. In her writings on the pre-Socratics and the Sophists, she tethered the untranslatable to the instability of meaning and sense-making, the perfor- mative dimension of sophistic effects, and the condition of temporality in translation. Translation’s “time,” in Cassin’s usage, was associated with the principle of infinite regress and the vertiginous apprehension of infinitude. (vii)
What made it unique was its attempt to rewrite the history of philosophy through the lens of the “untranslatable,” defined loosely as a term that is left untranslated as it is transferred from language to language (as in the examples of polis, Be- griff, praxis, Aufheben, mimesis, “feeling,” lieu commun, logos, “matter of fact”), or that is typically subject to mistranslation and retranslation.(vii)
The work’s international reception was then enlarged by its translations (some still under way) (vii)
to translate is an act of rewriting, and, in this particular instance, of assisting words in their be- coming philosophical. (viii)
“Theory” is an imprecise catchall for a welter of postwar movements in the human sciences—existentialism, structural anthropology, sociolinguistics, semiotics, history of mentalités, post-Freudian psychoanalysis, deconstruction, post- structuralism, critical theory, identity politics, post- colonialism, biopolitics, nonphilosophy, speculative materialism—that has no equivalent in European languages. What is often referred to as “theory” in an Anglophone context would simply be called“philosophy” in Europe. The Dictionary of Untranslatables acknowledges this divergence between “theory” and “philosophy” not at the expense of how the editors of the French edition defined philosophy (which, it must be said, was already noncanonical in the choice of terms deemed philosophical), but as a condition of the work’s reception by Anglophone readers accustomed to an eclectic “theory” bibliography that not infrequently places G.W.F. Hegel, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Walter Ben- jamin, Theodore Adorno, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, Gilles Deleuze, Julia Kristeva, Jean-Luc Nancy, Antonio Negri, Hélène Cixous, Kojin Karatani, Alain Badiou, Giorgio Agamben, Jacques Rancière, Bruno Latour, and Slavoj Žižek in the same rubric with Stuart Hall, Homi Bhabha, Donna Har- away, Henry Louis Gates, Judith Butler, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Friedrich Kittler, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Edward Said, Fredric Jameson, and Paul Gilroy.(viii)
“dictionary,” designating an aspiration to impossible completeness, was meant to stand alongside “vocabulary” as an ironic complement. (viii)
Philosophical importance, in this case, is accorded to how a term “is” in its native tongue, and how it “is” or “is not” when relocated or translated in another language. Idiomatic and demotic nuance are fully recognized as constitutive of philosophy, prompting a shift from concept-driven philosophical analysis to a new kind of process philosophy, what Cassin calls “philosophizing in languages.” (ix)
Though it is not set up as a concept-history, the Dictionary lends itself to pedagogical approaches that explicate how concepts come into existence in, through, and across languages. (ix)
What is needed, to get a comparative sense of things, is not a firmer or clearer translation of difficult words, but a feeling for how relatively simple words chase each other around in context. (x)
In this picture, what is lost in translation is often the best that can be found, as readers find their way to a Denkraum—a space of thinking, inventing, and translating, in which words no longer have a distinct definition proper to any one language.
This said, it is by no means self-evident what “untranslatability” means. This is how Jacques Derrida’s Monolingualism of the Other approaches the term (in Patrick Mensah’s translation):
Not that I am cultivating the untranslatable. Nothing is untranslatable, however little time is given to the expenditure or expansion of a com- petent discourse that measures itself against the power of the original. But the “untranslatable” remains—should remain, as my law tells me the poetic economy of the idiom, the one that is important to me, for I would die even more quickly without it, and which is important to me, myself to myself, where a given formal “quantity” always fails to restore the singular event of the original, that is to let it be forgotten once recorded, to carry away its number, the prosodic shadow of its quantum. . . . In a sense, nothing is untranslatable; but in another sense, everything is untranslatable; translation is another name for the impossible. In another sense of the word “translation,” of course, and from one sense to the other—it is easy for me always to hold firm between these two hyperboles which are fundamentally the same, and always translate each other.2 (x-xi)
2 Jacques Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other, trans. Patrick Mensah (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 56–67.
Each language, she maintained, “contains within itself the rules of its own invention and transgression.”4 The book emphasizes the singular philosophical nuances of discrete languages not because Cassin was committed to resurrecting fixtures of “ontological nationalism” (whereby languages are erected as stand-ins for national subjects), but rather because she wanted to emphasize the mobile outlines of languages assuming a national silhouette or subsiding into diffuse, polyglot worlds.(xiii)
Obscurity itself results (or may result) from the need of French philosophers to be French writers. Unlike German, whose truth is attained through verbal and syntactic unraveling, French syntax is notionally transparent to truth. Close to being an Adamic language in Badiou’s ascription, it lends itself to logical formalism, axioms, maxims, and universal principles. Above all, for Badiou, the French language is conducive to the politicization of expression, unseating predicates through the play of substitutions and the art of the imperious question (what Lacan called the “denunciatory enunciation”)(xiii)
Even the term “translation,” which signifies lan- guage in a state of non-belonging, turns out to be nationally marked. The entry TO TRANSLATE notes that dolmetschen, an anachronistic verb whose origins go back to Martin Luther’s translation of the Bible into German, renders “to translate” as, literally, “to render as German” or “to Germanize.” Schleiermacher was instrumental in replacing dolmetschen with übersetzung on the grounds that dolmetschen referred to the functional work of the interpreter, whereas übersetzung referred to the loftier challenge of rendering thought. From this perspective, übersetzung is the name of a dis- avowed Germanocentrism that clings to the history of the word “translation.”(xiii-xiv)
We became increasingly drawn to the paradoxical premise of the book, namely, that of the untranslatable as the interminably (not) translated. One of the risks of the casual use of “untranslatable” is the suggestion of an always absent perfect equivalence. Nothing is exactly the same in one language as in another, so the failure of translation is always necessary and absolute. Apart from its neglect of the fact that some pretty good equivalencies are available, this proposition rests on a mystification, on a dream of perfection we cannot even want, let alone have. If there were a perfect equivalence from language to language, the result would not be translation; it would be a replica. And if such replicas were possible on a regular basis, there would not be any languages, just one vast, blurred international jargon, a sort of late cancellation of the story of Babel. The untranslatable as a construct makes a place for the private anguish that we as translators experience when confronted with material that we don’t want to translate or see translated. A certain density or richness or color or tone in the source language seems so completely to defy rendering into another language that we would just as soon not try: the poverty of the result is too distressing, makes us miss the first language as we miss a friend or a child. This may be true at times, but we can make a virtue out of seeing differences, and the constant recourse to the metaphor of loss in translation is finally too easy. We can, in any case, be helped to see what we are missing, and that is what much of this book is about. (xiv)
The places where languages touch reveal the limits of discrete national languages and traditions. We obtain glimpses of languages in paradoxically shared zones of non-national belonging, at the edge of mutual unintelligibility. Such zones encompass opacities at the edges of the spoken and written, a bilingualism that owns up to the condition of unownable, unclaimable language property, and perverse grammatology. Untranslatables signify not because they are essentialist predicates of nation or ethnos with no ready equivalent in another language, but because they mark singularities of expression that contour a worldscape according to mistranslation, neologism, and semantic dissonance. (xv)
Introduction
Émile Benveniste’s pluralist and comparatist Vocabulary of Indo-European Institutions has been our model. In order to find the meaning of a word in one language, this book explores the networks to which the word belongs and seeks to understand how a network functions in one language by relating it to the networks of other languages. (xvii)
To speak of untranslatables in no way implies that the terms in question, or the expressions, the syntactical or grammatical turns, are not and cannot be translated: the untranslatable is rather what one keeps on (not) translating. But this indicates that their translation, into one language or another, creates a problem, to the extent of sometimes generating a neologism or imposing a new meaning on an old word. It is a sign of the way in which, from one language to another, neither the words nor the conceptual networks can simply be superimposed. (xvii)